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The Soviet Union Encounters Anglia: Britain’s Russian Magazine as a Medium for 
Cross-Border Communication 
 
Sarah Davies, Durham University 
 
 
As Cold War historians begin to gravitate away from “phenomena of the great” to 
“phenomena of the small,” attention has turned to the ostensibly minor actors, processes, and 
initiatives that were significant despite or even because of their size.
1
 This chapter explores 
one such small undertaking: Anglia, the Russian-language quarterly magazine about life in 
Britain, produced by the Foreign Office (FO) and distributed in the Soviet Union between 
1962 and 1992. 
Influencing and engaging with publics from the opposite camp was a high priority for 
both the East and the West throughout the Cold War. What was labelled variously as 
“psychological warfare,” “international propaganda,” “publicity,” “cultural diplomacy,” 
“cultural exchange,” or “public diplomacy” assumed multiple forms. While international 
broadcasting has attracted most attention, slower, smaller-scale media, such as magazines, 
also had an important, if less prominent, role to play in this process.
2
 Mass circulation 
periodicals were enormously popular by the mid twentieth century, with illustrated magazines 
of the Reader’s Digest, Life, and Paris-Match variety enjoying a particular boom.3 As East-
West communication began to accelerate from the mid 1950s, both camps came to regard 
national magazines such as Amerika, Anglia, and Soviet Weekly as an effective means of 
“perforating” the Iron Curtain and advertising the merits of their respective systems to the 
other side. 
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Unlike Amerika, which is relatively well-known and has been discussed by several 
scholars, Anglia appears to have been overlooked.
4
 In part this neglect reflects the familiar 
tendency of Cold War historiography to privilege the role of the superpowers at the expense 
of that of smaller actors. The burgeoning literature on the cultural Cold War includes multiple 
studies of American efforts to influence opinion behind the Iron Curtain,
5
 but it is only 
relatively recently that attention has turned to the parallel initiatives undertaken by Western 
European states, including those of Britain.
6
 Notwithstanding ambiguous feelings in Britain 
about the concept of “overseas propaganda,” with its connotations of “totalitarian” media 
manipulation, the British government, in contrast to that of the United States, had the 
advantage of extensive and diverse pre-Cold War experience in these matters which it was in 
a strong position to build upon. Despite, or perhaps because of, its waning global power, 
Britain was determined to offer an alternative, British contribution to a sphere that would 
otherwise have been dominated by the United States.
7
 
Drawing on Foreign Office archival material as well as the magazine itself, we 
consider how and why Anglia was established and investigate its fundamental ethos. 
Deliberately differentiated from Amerika, Anglia aimed to tell a subtle and credible story 
about Britain as a modern and progressive nation with a distinct set of values and way of life. 
We then shift our perspective to some apparently very minor actors: ordinary Soviet readers 
of Anglia who wrote letters to the magazine. Since it was considered important that Anglia 
serve as a catalyst for dialogue between Britain and the USSR, the exchange of letters 
between the editor and the readers was strongly encouraged. Although necessarily limited, 
this correspondence represents a small but intriguing example of how borders could be 
crossed, symbolically and physically, during the Cold War. 
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Magazine Diplomacy in the Cold War 
 
Following the post-war deep-freeze, the thaw in Soviet relations with the West that occurred 
after Stalin’s death – “the spirit of Geneva” – opened up new opportunities for various forms 
of cultural diplomacy and exchange. The USSR took the lead in these initiatives: the 
Bolsheviks had always viewed culture as a powerful political weapon and had been actively 
practising various forms of cultural diplomacy in the interwar period under the auspices of 
VOKS, the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.
8
 From the early 
1950s, Moscow embarked upon what was described in military terms by some Western 
observers as a new “cultural offensive” or “cultural campaign abroad,” using cultural 
diplomacy as a form of bridge building, as a means of acquiring useful information from the 
West, and as a somewhat more palatable way of exporting Soviet values.
9
 
Although initially suspicious of Soviet overtures, governments in the West soon 
joined in this new Cold War game. Even before 1956, the Americans had begun to question 
their strategy aimed at the “liberation” of the “captive peoples” behind the Iron Curtain 
through the use of covert operations and psychological warfare.
10
 Nikita Khrushchev’s 
“Secret Speech” and the crushing of the Hungarian Uprising simply confirmed these doubts, 
and the United States came to share the view prevailing in the Foreign Office that any change 
in the Soviet bloc would only come about as a result of a process of internal evolution. 
Assuming that exposure to Western values and ways of life would, in the long run, contribute 
to this evolution,
11
 the United States, Britain and other states began to invest in cultural 
diplomacy and exchange with the Soviet Union and its satellites. By the late 1950s, for 
example, official exchange agreements had been concluded between the USSR and France 
(1957), the United States (1958), and Great Britain (1959).
12
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It was in this relatively benign climate that Britain’s initial ideas for a new “Russian 
Magazine” emerged. The Soviet authorities had always gone to great lengths to obstruct the 
circulation of what it dubbed “capitalist propaganda,” including non-communist publications 
and radio broadcasts. In the 1950s, for example, the only British newspaper in general 
circulation in the Soviet Union was the communist Daily Worker, while the BBC’s Russian 
Service was routinely, if ineffectively, jammed. Gradually, small and not entirely symbolic 
steps were taken to ease the barriers to communication. Something of a breakthrough 
occurred at the high-level meeting in Britain between Khrushchev, Nikolai Bulganin, and the 
Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, in April 1956. Demonstrating that the Soviet Union was 
serious about “peaceful coexistence” and that Britain could play a key role in East-West 
relations, the talks resulted in a number of constructive agreements, including a joint 
declaration on the desirability of furthering cultural exchange and of taking “practical steps 
directed towards ensuring a freer exchange of information by the spoken and written word.”13 
A magazine seemed an obvious medium through which Britain could disseminate 
information by the written word. FO-sponsored “general projection” magazines such as 
Commonwealth Today and the Arabic-language Al Aalam had played a prominent role in 
British cultural diplomacy from the early 1950s.
14
 The magazine format was deemed 
particularly suitable for the USSR with its highly developed culture of reading.
15
 Periodicals 
were especially favoured by Soviet readers, and their circulation increased hugely in this 
period, reaching 2.6 billion by 1970, 14 times the 1950 level.
16
 The serious “thick journal,” 
such as Novyi mir, a blend of literature and broader socio-political articles, enjoyed 
phenomenal success amongst the burgeoning intelligentsia, particularly during the 
Khrushchev-era “Thaw.”17 The Foreign Office was evidently well aware of this tendency, 
with one official commenting that “the Russians wanted a good read.”18 
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A previous British government periodical, the illustrated weekly British Ally 
(Britanskii soiuznik), set up on the basis of a reciprocal agreement during the period of 
British-Soviet wartime cooperation, had been well received in the USSR, although it suffered 
when relations soured in the late 1940s, and was terminated in 1950 (its counterpart in 
Britain, Soviet Weekly, was permitted to survive).
19
 Support for a new version of British Ally 
gathered momentum from 1955, particularly after the relaunch of the U.S. illustrated 
magazine Amerika.
20
 Amerika, published from 1945 until 1952, was resurrected in 1956 
following a US-Soviet agreement concerning the reciprocal distribution of national 
magazines; its Soviet equivalent in the United States was USSR, later renamed Soviet Life. 
The British were evidently concerned not to be left out of this accelerating periodical 
diplomacy. However, the Soviet invasion of Hungary in November 1956 created dilemmas. 
On one hand, it caused temporary setbacks in cultural relations, as public revulsion created 
considerable pressure to ostracize the USSR, while on the other, it persuaded some officials 
of the urgency of extending cultural contacts in the interests of fomenting change, particularly 
amongst the Soviet intelligentsia and youth, who were perceived to be potentially rebellious 
and receptive to Western values. Cecil Parrott, Minister at the British Embassy in Moscow, 
pressed for a policy of what he called “injecting…western ideas” to encourage these groups. 
This view prevailed, and by 1957 the British government had accepted the case for a 
magazine.
21
 However, because of the vicissitudes of East-West relations and the intractable 
nature of Anglo-Soviet negotiations, as well as domestic financial pressures, it was only in 
January 1961 that an agreement to set up the magazine was finally concluded with the Soviet 
authorities. 
The wording of this agreement largely followed the model of the 1955 US-Soviet 
agreement on Amerika. It specified that the magazine should be “non-political in character” 
and “devoted to an objective presentation of various aspects of British life, particularly in the 
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sphere of culture, science and technology.” This was the price to be paid for a further clause 
maintaining that it would not be subject to censorship by the Soviet authorities. The Soviet 
agency, Soiuzpechat’, was to distribute fifty thousand copies of the quarterly magazine, with 
10 percent of these on subscription, while further two thousand complimentary copies were to 
be distributed by the British Embassy to Soviet institutions and individuals. If any copies 
remained unsold for three months, Soiuzpechat’ had the right to return them to the Embassy 
for a refund – an opportunity for the authorities to restrict the distribution of ideologically 
suspect editions. In return for all this – and reciprocity was always important – the British 
government agreed to facilitate the distribution of Soviet Weekly in the event of any 
difficulties.
22
 
Following the agreement, various practical arrangements were put in place. 
Responsibility for the production of the magazine was assigned to the Central Office of 
Information (COI), a service department established in 1946 to produce publicity material for 
government departments.
23
 The magazine’s editor was officially attached to the COI. 
However, it was the FO’s Information Research Department (IRD) that took charge of the 
magazine’s editorial policy. Formed in 1948 with the explicit remit of countering communist 
propaganda, this clandestine department had originally concentrated on anticommunist 
propaganda in Britain and areas of British influence, but from the mid 1950s it turned its 
attention to the Soviet bloc. It was thought that the IRD’s expertise in both communist states 
and propaganda made it especially qualified to take on the project.
24
 
The title of the new magazine was the subject of some discussion at this stage. Since 
Britain was (and is) generally known as Англия (Anglia – England) in Russia and the Soviet 
Union, Anglia seemed a natural choice by analogy with the two other national projection 
magazines then circulating in the USSR, Amerika and Jugoslaviia.
25
 It was acknowledged 
that this might provoke a vociferous reaction from the “Scottish lobby” in particular,26 yet it 
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proved difficult to find a suitably inclusive alternative. One suggestion, British Life, was 
vetoed in the USSR on the grounds that the word “life” had acquired a hint of “foreign 
propaganda penetration.” Velikobritaniia (Great Britain) was also rejected by FO officials 
who argued that it sounded too pompous and carried colonialist overtones in the USSR. A 
compromise suggestion, Britannia, was deemed to be poor Russian. Finally, it was agreed 
that the title Anglia should be accompanied by a sub-title: “a magazine about life in Great 
Britain today.”27 
 
 
Projecting “Life in Great Britain Today”: the Subtle Philosophy of Anglia 
 
This protracted discussion about the name of the magazine exemplifies the problem inherent 
in any attempt to establish a suitable narrative about contemporary Britain – it was one thing 
to propose a magazine about “life in Great Britain today”, but quite another to agree on 
precisely how to project such an amorphous and contested subject. The approach adopted by 
the IRD, which bore ultimate responsibility for the magazine’s editorial line, was informed 
by the department’s interpretation of Anglia’s objectives: 
 
The magazine aims at presenting an attractive, truthful and convincing picture of all 
aspects of Britain to serious Soviet readers. Although “Anglia” cannot deal directly 
with political subjects, this presentation of an honest and accurate picture of Britain 
can both counteract the misleading account given in the Soviet press, and reveal how 
unfavourably many aspects of life in the Soviet Union compare with Britain.
28
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To ensure that Britain was portrayed in a way that was both “attractive” as well as “truthful 
and convincing” required some subtlety. As Embassy officials had emphasized in 1957, they 
would have to be “careful not to risk accusations of propaganda (and to avoid this we shall 
have to be very subtle indeed!)”29 The British approach was distinguished from that of the 
Unites States in this respect, with the COI’s Director of Publications proposing a “rather 
subtler approach” than the “blatantly lavish efforts of the Americans.” It had always been 
envisaged that Britain’s magazine would be more modest than Amerika, partly for financial 
reasons and so as not to duplicate American efforts, but also because of differing notions 
about the whole matter of “publicity.” While Britain and the United States cooperated closely 
in this field, there was an assumption within the Foreign Office that American practices were 
inferior; for example, one FO official observed very little difference between British and 
American policies toward Eastern Europe, apart from in the area of “publicity” where “the 
Americans are more adventurous than we are.” This strategy had “not always proven more 
effective than our quieter methods.”30 
“Quiet” Amerika certainly was not. A large-format, sixty-page monthly magazine 
with a print run of fifty thousand copies, it was full of glossy color photographs and designed 
for a mass readership. It promoted the American way of life in a quite unashamed fashion: 
the first issue included a five-page spread on American cars, accompanied by a glaringly 
obvious price chart.
31
 By contrast, it was proposed in 1957 that Britain’s magazine should 
appear quarterly, initially in a run of about ten thousand copies (although this figure was later 
increased), and that it would have an unusual pocket-sized format (similar to that of the 
Readers’ Digest), which was considered to be more subtle than that of Amerika. It was 
thought that the small size would allow the reader to hide it in their pocket, and mean that it 
was likely to be longer-lasting, passed around and kept on bookshelves. While it was 
intended that the magazine should be illustrated, the main emphasis was to be upon text 
297 
 
oriented toward a particular readership, “the intelligent, non-technical, layman, particularly of 
the emergent middle class and the administrative class.”32 This was in line with the elite-
oriented tradition of British overseas propaganda, which aimed to target the “influential few 
and through them at the many.”33 All these proposals were ultimately adopted, thus ensuring 
that Anglia’s identity remained quite distinct from that of Amerika. 
Once the magazine was up and running, various strategies were employed to 
minimize any risk that it might be rejected as blatant propaganda by its readers. Anglia never 
criticized the USSR directly; on the contrary, it aimed to project an attitude of friendship and 
mutual respect between the two countries. For example, articles about science often 
mentioned the connections between British and Soviet scientists, and the magazine regularly 
reported on visits between the two countries, the activities of the GB-USSR Association and 
so on.
34
 More controversially, an article on “Lenin in London” was even published in 1967 to 
mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution, despite the initial reservations of 
some FO officials who agreed that it should go ahead only if it was used as an opportunity to 
include photographs showing how the parts of London Lenin had visited had changed for the 
better: “anything which brings home the point that Lenin’s ideas are totally unrelated to the 
world of today, without of course ever saying that!”35 
Rather than engaging in explicitly negative propaganda, the Anglia team concentrated 
on telling a positive story about Britain designed both to interest the serious Soviet reader and 
to draw an implicit contrast with life in the USSR. In 1957, the COI had suggested that the 
magazine focus on “the common experiences of people in relatively similar circumstances, so 
that the reader may readily identify himself with the subject of the article.”36 Anglia certainly 
followed this recommendation, for many of its articles addressed subjects of common interest 
and experience, particularly science and technology, industry and agriculture, the arts, sport, 
and leisure. However, the view from the Embassy in Moscow was that British political 
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objectives would be better served by dwelling on areas in which Britain differed substantially 
from the Soviet Union, such as government, the legal system, education, trade unions, and so 
on.
37
 While this was precluded to some degree by the “nonpolitical” terms of the Anglia 
agreement, later issues did begin to incorporate more explicitly sociopolitical content 
designed to underline differences, rather than similarities, between the two societies. In 
addition, the magazine regularly featured extracts from contemporary British literature, 
crosswords, material on the regions of Britain, examples of humor, and items in English. In 
order to avoid a “rag-bag” appearance and to engage the serious reader with complex 
subjects, Anglia was frequently centered on one major theme, such as chemistry or travel, 
although most issues also contained additional material unrelated to the theme. A 
representative example from the mid 1960s, Anglia no. 11, included articles connected to the 
main theme of British design, as well as material on parliamentary elections, cricket, books 
published in 1963, East Anglia, fashion, the nervous system, stamps, and English sporting 
terminology, plus some caricatures, a short story, and a crossword.
38
 
Whether the subject was sport or department stores, education or gardening, the 
underlying message was always that Britain represented modernity and progress. Great 
emphasis was placed upon the country’s recent economic achievements and scientific 
advances (the latter were accorded a particularly high priority given the prestige of Soviet 
science.) Britain was presented as a land of contented workers and consumers reaping the 
benefits of a buoyant economy and a thriving welfare state, and as the home to a diverse, 
innovative, and widely accessible modern culture (in both its high and popular variants). The 
British political system was portrayed as genuinely democratic and as open to modern 
developments such as opinion polling. This “branding” of Britain as modern and progressive 
was considered essential given that Soviet propaganda constantly painted a picture of the 
country as backward looking and in steady decline. In 1961, as detailed plans for the first 
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editions of the magazine were being drawn up, the IRD’s Mark Russell argued they “must try 
to get across the impression of a progressive society which is moving forward all the time as 
against the picture of capitalist stagnation with which the Soviet public have been fed.”39 At a 
time when the USSR seemed to many in the world to represent the future, Anglia needed to 
show that a modern Britain offered a viable alternative to the Soviet socialist model of 
modernity (and, implicitly if not explicitly, to the American version of capitalist modernity, 
too). 
This image of an unequivocally modern and progressive Britain was necessarily based 
on a somewhat selective approach to the “truth.” As Lord Christopher Mayhew – one of the 
prime movers behind the creation of the IRD and an Anglia supporter – subsequently 
observed, the key to effective propaganda was the selection of facts: “The policy of IRD was 
not to lie or distort facts, but to select the facts that proved our case.”40 Written in a 
dispassionate rather than an opinionated style, Anglia’s articles incorporated a dazzling array 
of facts and figures; for example, detailed statistics were inserted into many of the articles, 
and the editor went to considerable lengths to ensure that these were up-to-date, accurate, and 
in line with those used by the BBC Russian Service.
41
 To enhance credibility, the personal 
testimonies of concrete individuals were often incorporated, and, where possible, their direct 
speech was used since this was thought to be more convincing than indirect reporting. Visual 
images were also employed as evidence to substantiate the claims of the magazine, as well as 
to make it more interesting – while Anglia was never intended to be as lavishly illustrated as 
Amerika, it was still important that Soviet citizens could see aspects of British life for 
themselves. Appealing photographs accompanied many articles, particularly those devoted to 
fashion, furniture, and so on. 
This attractive vision would have seemed unbalanced and unconvincing without at 
least some acknowledgement of the problems Britain faced. Right at the outset, the 
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magazine’s first editor, Wright Miller, insisted that they should be “frank sometimes about 
our deficiencies.”42 However, the nature and extent of this frankness were never entirely 
clear. In 1961, the IRD’s Mavis King asked “are we allowed to include criticism, i.e. x 
houses have no indoor sanitation, 40 children in the class?” Her opinion was that “some 
negative facts must be included, otherwise the Russians are going to classify everything we 
say as propaganda.” Mark Russell agreed that problems should not be hidden, but suggested 
that the magazine should always indicate what was being done to tackle issues such as slums. 
Another FO official, Bryan Cartledge, also argued for a cautious approach since “the Soviet 
press pounces joyfully on admissions of defects in Western society and one gets no credit for 
‘good sportsmanship’ in showing both sides of the picture”; Pravda would delight in 
beginning an article by stating that “According to the official British magazine Anglia 15% of 
British homes have no inside sanitation…” Cartledge recommended focusing on “past 
shortcomings which have been or are being remedied.” Presenting as full a picture of Britain 
as possible, with the emphasis not on “hiding shortcomings” but on showing how problems 
were being tackled, was thus the approach that was said to inform editorial policy.
43
 
 
 
Exchanging Letters: Readers’ Correspondence with Anglia 
 
How successful was this effort to explain the British way of life to Soviet readers? Although 
it was always difficult to measure its effectiveness, the magazine, with its “subtle” approach, 
appeared to be well received by both the Soviet authorities and the educated public. It was 
clearly in high demand, its circulation was not generally obstructed, and the available 
evidence suggested it was being read by the desired target groups: professionals and younger 
people. Informal conversations indicated that most readers did not dismiss it as 
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“propaganda,” perceiving it rather as interesting and informative. Some claimed explicitly 
that they preferred it to Amerika.
44
 Importantly, Anglia managed to stimulate a process of 
two-way communication: readers were strongly encouraged to correspond with the editor, not 
only because their feedback was valuable, but also because the whole process of dialogue 
with individual Soviet citizens was considered intrinsically worthwhile in itself. 
The USSR had always had a tradition of encouraging letter writing to the press, and 
journals such as Novyi Mir clearly received large quantities of readers’ mail in this period.45 
However, writing to a foreign periodical was another matter altogether. Censorship of mail 
continued to be routine in the post-Stalin USSR, and corresponding with foreigners was still 
regarded as a risky activity. The IRD’s Mavis King thus observed that the thirty letters Anglia 
received in 1962 might not seem many, but were “more than I dared to hope for.” By way of 
comparison, it is worth noting that the much more widely accessible BBC Russian Service 
only received forty-one letters in 1956, and somewhat over a hundred in 1963.
46
 Between 
1962 and 1969, a total of 240 letters reached the offices of Anglia.
47
 Of course we cannot 
know how many never made it at all. The letters were never published in the magazine, but a 
small selection from the periods 1963–65 and 1974–75 have been retained in the Foreign 
Office archives, along with an even smaller sample of the editors’ responses. Although the 
numbers are quite limited, some conclusions can be drawn from them.
48
 
What is quite striking is the geographical spread of the correspondence. Anglia was 
supposed to be available in eighty cities, and readers certainly wrote in from as far afield as 
Magadan, Perm, Vladivostok, and Yalta. Indeed it may be surmised that communication with 
foreigners was valued particularly highly by those living far from Moscow, Leningrad, and 
other cities with greater exposure to foreign influences. It is also clear that most letters 
emanated from professionals and young people (many of those who wrote in 1974–75 
described themselves as students or children). While the majority wrote in Russian, some 
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correspondents enjoyed practising their English. They generally supplied their names and 
addresses, evidently anticipating that their letters would elicit a response.
49
 
Not surprisingly, the content of their letters was, from a political point of view, 
ostensibly quite innocuous. Some wrote simply to express their appreciation of the magazine. 
Others offered constructive criticisms, or suggested themes Anglia could address, ranging 
from pop music and the lives of young people to contemporary visual arts, cinema, cartoons, 
and even fireworks. Correspondents also requested further information relating to specific 
articles they had read, or asked to be put in touch with British specialists on topics covered by 
the magazine. A few readers even made polite requests for material objects such as records, 
books, or postcards.
50
 
Regardless of their content, these letters from ordinary Soviet citizens were highly 
valued by the FO, and the Anglia editor was expected to handle them in an appropriately 
responsive manner. The first editor, Wright Miller, seemed particularly well suited to this 
task. He was equipped with a good knowledge of the USSR, having visited the country 
several times, including a spell during the war when he worked for British Ally in Moscow 
and Kuibyshev. After the war, he had served as a London-based editor of Ally. In 1960 he 
published his Russians as People, a book that expressed much understanding of and 
sympathy for the Russian people (as opposed to the Soviet political system). One of the 
book’s themes was the centrality of personal relationships in Russian culture: Miller argued 
that Russians set great store by personal ties and friendships and observed the importance of 
“respect for and expression of genuine personal feeling.”51 
In his correspondence with Soviet readers, Miller always took trouble to cultivate a 
sense of warm friendship and trust between editor and reader, to avoid an official, 
bureaucratic approach, and to demonstrate that he cared about each correspondent on a 
personal level. He made sure to answer letters fully and in a sympathetic and personal tone, 
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paying attention to even the smallest details of the correspondence. For example, he 
concluded his reply to one 19-year-old Vitalii Reshetov, who had mentioned in passing that 
he was taking exams: “Wishing you all success with your entrance examination for the 
institute, and thereafter…” Wright Miller’s successors also followed this practice: when a 12-
year-old Dima Droshnev professed to be a long-time reader of the magazine and to be 
studying English with the help of his sister, a later editor, Jean Penfold, sent cordial greetings 
to Droshnev and his sister and wished him well with his studies. This warm, friendly tone 
was often echoed by the correspondents themselves, for example, one concluded his missive 
with the words “To end this letter, I wish you a lot of success, to you personally and to 
‘Anglia.’”52 
The editor and correspondents often exchanged seasonal greetings, a practice that 
served to reinforce the impression of personal friendship. A regular correspondent, Volkov 
from Magadan, sent Wright Miller his greetings for Christmas and New Year, expressing his 
hope that “the New Year and further numbers of Anglia will enable us to continue our 
correspondence in the same friendly manner as before.” Else Brucene, a teacher from 
Lithuania, wrote to compliment the editors on the magazine, which she claimed to use in her 
teaching: “I await the appearance of each new issue as a feast.” Brucene accompanied her 
letter with a New Year’s card. The editor in turn thanked her for the “delightful” card and 
encouraged her to continue the correspondence and pass on her suggestions for future issues. 
A Margarita Pasekova from Moscow wished the editorial team her best wishes for the New 
Year adding: “I would like our friendship to continue in the New Year.” Pasekova included a 
New Year’s poem beginning with the lines: “The good Russian Father Frost / Wishes you to 
take leave of the old year without tears / And to greet the New Year and to love it.”53 
Another means of cultivating friendship between the editor and the readers of the 
magazine involved the giving and receiving of gifts. Anglia endeavoured where possible to 
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satisfy readers’ requests for various small items: the aforementioned Volkov from Magadan, 
who had read a report on razor blades in Anglia (reprinted from the British consumer 
magazine Which?), was given a Wilkinson blade, which he clearly appreciated – although he 
complained that he had only received one blade rather than the two he was promised! The 
magazine sometimes sent out books, for example, a reader from Gorky, L. Krai, was given a 
book about British proverbs, a subject on which he had expressed an interest. Cards and 
pictures were common gifts, especially postcards of London or pictures of British pop 
groups. In some cases, the principle of reciprocity seems to have been observed. A regular 
correspondent from Uzhgorod, Pavel Sankov (an engineer), who had requested information 
about various matters, including British architecture and landscape gardening, gave Wright 
Miller a guide to his region, the Transcarpathian oblast, “for our better acquaintance.” In his 
reply, Miller expressed his delight at having received the volume. L. Krai, the recipient of the 
book about British proverbs, reciprocated with some postcards about Russian proverbs, while 
one couple, the Baizantovs from Cheliabinsk, sent Miller a set of postcards of Tbilisi in 
exchange for the postcards of London he had sent them. Their letter provides an interesting 
indication of the depth of emotion the relationship with the editor could evoke, for they 
claimed to be “unspeakably glad” to receive his “wonderful letter”, continuing: 
 
We are extremely grateful for your sensitiveness, for your warm words, for your 
invaluable help in realising our old dream – correspondence with your country…and 
at last for your brilliant gift – wonderful postcards with the sights of London. We 
earnestly ask you in token of our deep gratitude to take our modest present – series of 
post-cards with the sights of our beautiful city – Tbilisi…54 
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The Baizantovs’ mention of “correspondence with your country” was a reference to Miller’s 
success in putting them in touch with a pen-friend. The business of cultivating British-Soviet 
friendship required not only the exchange of warm words and small gifts, but also the 
provision of various types of practical assistance to the magazine’s readers. Particularly in the 
mid 1970s, when détente was flourishing, many Soviet citizens asked Anglia to help them 
find pen-friends. Their requests were usually satisfied, frequently with the help of the GB-
USSR Association. In this way the initial correspondence with Anglia often acted as the 
catalyst for a further process of East-West communication. One notable example was 
Anglia’s facilitation of correspondence between a bed-bound reader, Dzhaminat Kerimova 
from Makhachkala, and Lady Susan Masham, a campaigner for the rights of people with 
disabilities who had been the subject of a feature in the magazine. When Kerimova wrote to 
Anglia to ask if they could pass on her letter to Lady Masham, they did so, as well as offering 
to pass on and translate further correspondence. Masham herself duly responded with a full 
letter, in which she discussed her own disability and expressed an interest in Kerimova’s life, 
and that of disabled people in the USSR more generally. She volunteered to continue the 
correspondence and send Kerimova magazines about the disabled in Britain.
55
 
The editors and FO officials went to considerable lengths to satisfy correspondents’ 
requests for information on all manner of subjects. The strict rationing of information within 
the USSR created a tremendous “thirst for knowledge” and many readers appeared to value 
Anglia as a source of useful and credible information.
56
 Following the publication in the 
magazine of a profile of Diana Barnes, a postgraduate medical researcher, a professor at a 
Moscow children’s hospital wrote to enquire whether Barnes could supply some specific 
information about breast cancer treatment. Anglia arranged for Dr Barnes to contact her 
directly. Similarly, a professor of Biological Sciences from Ul’ianovsk, who had read articles 
about British agriculture in the magazine, went on to ask for further material on wheat 
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selection in Britain and this was arranged through the GB-USSR Association. Stanislav Gurin 
wrote to Wright Miller from Kharkov to communicate his feelings about the death of a 
British specialist on the poet Alexander Blok – “I was extremely sorry to hear from you of 
the death of Sir Cecil Kisch; the death even of someone with whom one is not acquainted can 
produce a sad impression” – and to ask if there were any other Blok specialists in Britain. 
Miller spent some time tracking down and putting him in touch with the relevant experts.
57
 
As well as assisting Anglia readers with their requests for pen-friends and 
information, the editors helped out in other ways, from correcting the English of 
correspondents who were learning the language, to attempting to resolve the problems of 
those having difficulty subscribing to the magazine.
58
 This practical help, in conjunction with 
the personal approach, seems to have been greatly appreciated. The editor was regarded by 
some not so much as a British government official but rather as a trusted friend. Certainly this 
is the impression conveyed by one of Wright Miller’s regular correspondents, Savitskii from 
Stavropol, who wrote to the magazine to express his grief at the death of Miller, whose 
obituary was published in Anglia in 1974.
59
 Savitskii had conducted an extensive 
correspondence with Miller that he clearly treasured. He recalled how the editor “did not 
leave a single of our letters unanswered and always patiently replied to all our queries. We 
awaited his replies eagerly and read them with the greatest interest. His letters, as his articles, 
were full of his gentle sense of humour, showing that he was a good and out of the common 
person.” Savitskii enclosed a card for Wright Miller’s wife and daughters, which read: “My 
wife, my son and I deeply mourn and share your grief on losing your husband and father, Mr. 
Wright Miller.”60 
By promoting the exchange of letters between the editor and the readers in this way, 
Anglia facilitated grassroots communication between Britain and the USSR during the Cold 
War. Ordinary individuals from all over the USSR felt inspired to enter into friendly 
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correspondence, not only with the editors themselves, but also with others whom they 
encountered thanks to Anglia’s interventions. Although these Soviet citizens may not have 
been able to travel to Britain in a physical sense, their letters certainly did, and this must have 
gone some way to eroding their sense of isolation from the West (and, quite possibly, their 
British correspondents’ sense of isolation from the East).61 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The enduring fascination with the actions of the two main protagonists in the Cold War 
drama has tended to obscure the roles played by other supporting actors. This case study of 
Anglia builds on recent research that has cast light on Britain’s very significant involvement 
in the cultural Cold War.
62
 Motivated by the desire to maintain global influence and prestige 
at a time of decline and aware that it had considerable pre-Cold War experience on which it 
could draw, the British government was determined to make its own distinctive contribution 
to the process of East-West communication. Although Britain and the United States always 
cooperated closely, it was accepted that the two allies could only gain from “shooting at the 
same target from different angles.”63 
When compared with the lavishly funded initiatives of the United States or the USSR, 
or even with Britain’s own activities in the sphere of radio broadcasting to the Soviet Union, 
Anglia might justifiably be regarded as one of the “small phenomena” of the Cold War.64 
Produced by one of the lesser “great powers,” it cost relatively little and was designed to have 
a modest reach. In terms of physical appearance it was, quite literally, small. Nevertheless, it 
would be fair to claim that the magazine was remarkably successful, in part because of its 
small scale and subtle approach. Anglia told an appealing and reasonably credible story about 
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Britain to Soviet citizens who were hungry for any information about zagranitsa (abroad).
65
 
By showing that Britain possessed a distinct ethos and way of life, Anglia complicated 
simplistic binary notions about “East” and “West.” In its own small way, it helped to break 
down barriers and ease communication between Britain and the USSR, not only at the level 
of the state, but perhaps equally importantly, at the level of the ordinary individual. By 1992, 
when the last issues of the magazine appeared, the Cold War was over, and Anglia’s work 
appeared to have been done. 
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